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I.
INTRODUCTION
[A]s liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone,
but would have everything to fear from its union with either of the
other departments . . . it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its co-ordinate branches.
–The Federalist Papers, No. 781
One principle that generally guides courts in the United States
and Canada is the individual’s right to a neutral magistrate.2 For example, suppose that you are faced with the misfortune of being prosecuted for a crime. You face a tough prosecutor, but you trust the
process to lead to a fair result. Soon, you realize that the judge is not
as neutral as you once thought she was. Upon closer examination,
you realize that the judge answers entirely to the governor of your
state and retains very little protection from removal by the governor.
As a result, you fear that the judge will determine your fate with an
eye towards appeasing the political objectives of a political figure.
Clearly, this hypothetical is anathema to the guiding principle of judicial neutrality. Or, rather, consider this hypothetical: You are
standing in front of a judge, but this judge has not only been vocal
against people in your same shoes, but has also been known to rule
against people with your type of claim ninety-five percent of the
time. Couple this with the fact that this judge serves a fixed term and
is relying upon the graces of a political figure for reappointment
when their term comes to an end. Both hypotheticals seem to be
contrary to the principle of the separation of powers.

1

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 392-93 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed.,

2009).
2
See U.S. CONST. amend IV; Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 7 (U.K.).
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Yet, the first hypothetical is the situation that immigrants find
themselves dealing with in America,3 and the second is the situation
that immigrants find themselves dealing with in Canada.4 In both
systems, major questions have been raised regarding public trust and
institutional bias against each nation’s version of the Executive.5
Changing an entire system seems like a mammoth undertaking; are
there any methods that normal legal practitioners can take in ensuring that immigration judiciaries maintain impartiality and insulation
from the political agendas of political figures?
This Note will proceed to answer this question in multiple parts.
In Part I, this Note will provide a brief background of both the Canadian and American immigration courts, particularly their composition. In Part II, this Note will briefly detail the civil service systems
of both Canada and the United States and will highlight where each
immigration judiciary resides within those frameworks. In Part III,
this Note will argue that to reduce the purported bias and politicization of each respective judiciary, it is necessary for these systems to
become further entrenched in their respective nation’s civil service
systems, rather than the “one foot in, one foot out” approach that is
currently in force. In Part III, this Note will highlight the specific
issues facing each system, as well as provide practical arguments
that practitioners in the field can make to provide for such insulation
within their civil service systems.
II.

IMMIGRATION SYSTEMS

A.

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
Enacted in 2001, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
(IRPA) established the current Immigration and Refugee Board
(IRB) of Canada.6 IRPA created a detailed structure of who makes
3
See Tal Kopan, AG William Barr Promotes Immigration Judges with High
Asylum Denial Rates, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Aug. 23, 2019, 8:09 PM),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/AG-William-Barr-promotesimmigration-judges-with-14373344.php?psid=o3YbU.
4
See Jacqueline Bonisteel, Ministerial Influence at the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board: The Case for Institutional Bias, 27 REFUGE J. 103, 105
(2010).
5
See Kopan, supra note 3; see also Bonisteel, supra note 4.
6
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, C 27 (Can.).
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up the IRB and how these members are appointed.7 The IRB is composed of the Refugee Protection Division, the Refugee Appeal Division, the Immigration Division, and the Immigration Appeal Division.8 This Note will focus mainly on the Refugee Protection Division, which handles asylum claims, because the risks of any political bias would be the most damaging here. Members of the IRB are
appointed to their positions by “the Governor in Council, to hold
office during good behavior for a term not exceeding seven years,
subject to removal by the Governor in Council at any time for
cause.”9 Although the statutory language is silent on any further details regarding appointment, the Cabinet subjects potential appointees to a rigorous vetting process.10 For example, potential board
members undergo “written tests, [and] are screened and interviewed
by IRB officials, external experts and panels . . . before being recommended by the Minister for appointment.”11
B.

The Executive Office of Immigration Review
The United States immigration judiciary is formally referred to
as the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR).12 On January 9, 1983, Congress established the EOIR as an executive agency
within the Department of Justice “to adjudicate immigration cases
by fairly, expeditiously, and uniformly interpreting and administering the Nation’s immigration laws.”13 According to the Code of Federal Regulations, these immigration judges are the literal representation of the Attorney General in all immigration proceedings.14 In
other words, the Executive hires these judges through an internal
process. As of 2018, President Trump has removed most civil service requirements, such as written exams, from the hiring of administrative law judges (ALJs), as immigration judges are classified
7

Id. §§ 151-53.
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, C 27, § 151 (Can.).
9
Id. § 153(1)(a).
10
See Innessa Colaiacovo, Not Just the Facts: Adjudicator Bias and Decisions of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2006-2011), 1 J. ON
MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 122, 124 (2013).
11
Id. at 124..
12
Executive Office of Immigration Review, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir (last visited Sept. 16, 2020).
13
Id.
14
8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (2014).
8
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under this category.15 The President has retained only one minimum
standard for ALJ recruitment: possession of a license to practice
law.16 In 2018, the Supreme Court in Lucia v. SEC17 effectively
ruled that SEC ALJs are “officers” under the Appointments Clause,
which may lead future attorneys general (if they presume ALJs to
be “inferior” officers under the Appointments Clause) to believe that
they are free to appoint these judges in any way they see fit so long
as the constitutional minimum—a simple bar license—is met.18
Although appointments of immigration judges may now have
very little, if any, criteria for hiring,19 are there removal protections
for these judges? Could the Attorney General remove immigration
judges that flout his or her policy objectives? Congress has provided
ALJs a blanket protection from arbitrary removal, where ALJs can
only be disciplined or removed for “good cause established and determined by the Merit System Protection Board.”20 However, this
protection is less secure than it seems. Some federal circuits have
held that agencies can set the standards for the quality of decisionmaking that could establish removal “for cause.”21 Therefore,
agency heads have vast discretion to remove ALJs because they can
establish the criteria themselves. Nevertheless, Congress passed this
law years before Lucia, indicating that this blanket protection may
or may not be applicable to ALJs anymore and could even be rendered unconstitutional for the same reasons as the hiring criteria
above.
C.

The Appointments Clause
The Constitution vests the President of the United States with
the power to appoint ministers that will help him or her with the
power to execute the laws of the United States.22 The Constitution
states that the President:

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32755 (July 10, 2018).
Id.
Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
Exec. Order No. 13,843, supra note 15.
See id.
5 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
See Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 676 (2d. Cir. 1989).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads
of Departments.23
The text of this clause provides more questions than answers.
Who are “Officers of the United States”? Who are “inferior Officers”? How does the clause define “Courts of Law” and “Heads of
Departments”? Lastly, does the Constitution allow these officers to
be appointed in another manner? The Supreme Court has attempted
to answer some of these questions, albeit with little clarification.
The Court provided a definitive answer as to whether the Constitution is permissive of other manners of the appointment of officers.24 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court determined that the appointment
of commissioners to the Federal Election Committee was in violation of the Appointments Clause because, in passing the Federal
Election Campaign Act, Congress retained the power to appoint four
of the six members of the commission.25 The Court found that such
a method of appointment violated the clause because the text was
clear in establishing who may appoint officers—that is, the President.26 Put differently, the Appointments Clause explicitly left Congress out of this equation, with the very narrow exception of seeking
the advice and consent of the Senate for confirmations.27 Therefore,
the Court has made clear that the Appointments Clause is the only
method of appointing officers.
Another question that the Court has provided some guidance on
is what differentiates an “officer” and a simple “employee” of the

23
24
25
26
27

Id.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Id. at 125-26.
Id. at 127
Id.
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Executive Branch.28 In Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court held that special trial judges that help the Tax Court
judges are indeed officers, and not mere employees, because “they
perform more than ministerial tasks,”29 and “they take testimony,
conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the
power to enforce compliance with discovery orders.”30 Therefore,
the Court provided some rubric to examine whether one is an officer
or employee, albeit slightly obscure. This determination would be
further changed through the Court’s ruling in Lucia v. SEC,31 which
will be discussed in further detail in another Part.
Finally, the Court has offered some guidance on the difference
between a “principal” officer, which requires the advice and consent
of the Senate, and an “inferior” officer, whose appointment is decided entirely by the “Heads of Departments” or “Courts of Law.”32
In Morrison v. Olson, the Court held that a judicially appointed independent counsel was an inferior officer rather than a principal officer because he can be removed by the Attorney General for cause,
has inferior power to the Attorney General, and is appointed for a
limited tenure with limited jurisdiction.33 However, unsatisfied with
the fact that such a rubric implies that every officer that is not a Cabinet member is inferior, the Court revisited the issue in Edmond v.
United States.34 The Court modified the test with a much more strict
rubric, stating that inferior officers are those “whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed
by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”35 Such a ruling did not anticipate the Court’s decision in Lucia,
which would offer a significant change to our understanding of
where ALJs, particularly immigration judges, would be classified.

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

See Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
Id. at 881.
Id. at 881-82.
See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. 2044.
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
Id. at 671-72.
See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997) (emphasis added).
Id. at 663.
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CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS

A.

The American Civil Service System
Under Title V of the United States Code, executive agencies
have the authority to “employ such number of employees of the various classes . . . as Congress may appropriate for from year to year.36
Employment under this Title is under the purview of the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) whose Director is responsible for
“executing, administering, and enforcing . . . the civil service rules
and regulations of the President and the Office and the laws governing the civil service . . . .”37 as well as “aiding the President, as the
President may request, in preparing such civil service rules as the
President prescribes.”38 Title V also generally prescribes how ALJs
are to be appointed under the OPM.39 Agencies that require formal
proceedings under sections 556 and 557 “shall appoint as many
ALJs as are necessary.”40
Through the OPM, the President must provide rules that establish “open, competitive examinations for testing applicants for appointment in the competitive service which are practical in character
and . . . relate to matters that fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the applicants for the appointment sought.”41 Under the
OPM regulations, ALJs are designated as positions within the competitive service42 and the Director of the OPM “shall prescribe the
examination methodology in the design of each ALJ examination.”43 Although the OPM has refused to undertake the whole hiring process for ALJs for other agencies, OPM does possess authority
to
(1) Recruit and examine applicants for ALJ positions, including developing and administering the
ALJ examinations . . . (2) Assure that decisions concerning the appointment, pay, and tenure of ALJs in
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

5 U.S.C. § 3101 (1966).
Id. § 1103(a)(5)(A).
Id. § 1103(a)(7).
See id. § 3105.
Id.
Id. § 3304(a)(1).
5 C.F.R. § 930.201(b) (2020).
Id. § 930(201)(d).
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Federal agencies are consistent with applicable laws
and regulations; [and] (3) Establish classification and
qualification standards for ALJ positions.44
Nevertheless, although the ALJs are hired by their own agencies,
the OPM statutorily retains the power to “determine . . . the level in
which each administrative law judge position shall be placed and the
qualifications to be required for appointment to each level.”45
Congress afforded ALJs some level of statutory protection from
at-will termination.46 Under Title V of the United States Code, actions can be taken against ALJs by their respective agencies “only
for good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems
Protection Board on the record after opportunity for hearing before
the Board.”47 Such actions could consist of removals, suspensions,
reductions in grade, reductions in pay, and/or a furlough of thirty
days or less.48 Only after this determination of good cause is removal
of ALJs possible.49 The implication of this is that “an agency other
than the hiring agency is ultimately responsible for the ALJ’s tenure” because the hiring agency cannot remove an ALJ without a
good cause determined by another agency.50 However, such review
by the Board becomes less clear with regard to exactly what standards the Board needs to use. Nevertheless, the circuits seem to indicate that the standards that ALJs must meet are set by the agencies
themselves.51
Therefore, ALJs in the American context retain a significant
amount of protections that are granted to members of the civil service, including independent recruitment and examination from OPM
as well as protection through the Merit Board with the very key limit
noted above.
44

Id. § 930.201(e)(1-3).
5 U.S.C. § 5372(b)(2) (2020).
46
See id. § 7521(a).
47
Id.
48
Id. § 7521(b)(1-5).
49
Id.
50
GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 315 (Thomson West, 8th
ed. 2018).
51
See id.; see also Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[I]t
was entirely within the Secretary’s discretion to adopt reasonable administrative
measures in order to improve the decision-making process.”).
45
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B.

Location of Immigration Judges within the Civil Service
Although the Southern Poverty Law Center disputes the claim
that American immigration judges are actually ALJs,52 the Department of Justice clearly refers to them as “administrative law
judges”53 and the Code of Federal Regulations asserts that they are
“administrative judges” appointed by the Attorney General.54 Because the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Code of Federal
Regulations do not expressly nor implicitly indicate that the above
civil service rules do not apply to immigration judges, the civil service rules and protections would apply to immigration judges as
ALJs, at least prior to 2018.55 After the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Lucia, the status of ALJs with regard to how they are hired
and fired has been called into question and will be discussed later in
this Note.56 For now, this section will detail the status of the hiring
of immigration judges prior to Lucia.
Prior to 2018, immigration judges were selected through a seven
step hiring process as was the Attorney General’s right under 5
C.F.R. section 930.201(e).57 Signed off by former Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales in 2007, the first step in this process required between seven to nine immigration judges from among the Chief Immigration Judge, Deputy Chief Immigration Judges, and Assistant
Chief Immigration Judges to “evaluate and recommend applications,” placing them in one of three categories: “Highly

52
The Attorney General’s Judges: How the U.S. Immigration Courts Became
a Deportation Tool SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (June 25, 2019),
https://www.splcenter.org/20190625/attorney-generals-judges-how-us-immigration-courts-became-deportation-tool (“Immigration judges are not even ‘administrative law judges,’ whose authority derives from Article I of the Constitution and
who conduct proceedings under the Administrative Procedure Act.”).
53
Meet the Administrative Law Judges, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/meet-administrative-law-judges (last visited Sept.
13, 2020) (“EOIR’s administrative law judges (ALJs) serve in the Office of the
Chief Administrative Hearing Officer.”).
54
8 C.F.R. §1003.10(a).
55
Lawson, supra note 50, at 315.
56
See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2044 (2018).
57
Lee Liberman Otis, Memorandum for the Attorney General: Immigration
Judge Hiring Process (March 29, 2007), as reprinted in Dana J. Boente, Memorandum for the Attorney General: Immigration Judge Hiring Process (April 4,
2007), at 6.
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Recommend,” “Recommend,” and “Do Not Recommend.”58 Thereafter, the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ) will then
separate the applications into three preliminary tiers.59 The applicants in the first tier must contain those applications where more
than half of the initial evaluating judges categorized the application
as “Highly Recommend.”60 The second tier must contain applications where at least one evaluator categorized the application as
“Highly Recommend.”61 The third tier contains only those applications that only received “Recommend” and “Do Not Recommend”
categorizations.62 At the end of this step, the Director of the EOIR
and the Chief Immigration Judge will once again review the applications in the second and third tiers “to determine whether any
should be included in the first tier.”63
In Step Two of the Gonzales Process, OCIJ begins contacting
each applicant in the first tier, requesting a writing sample and work
references.64 Then, in Step Three, multiple three-member EOIR
panels composed of either two Deputy Chief Immigration Judges or
Assistant Chief Immigration Judges and one senior EOIR manager
will begin conducting interviews with all applicants in the first tier.65
After each interview, the panels will create packets on each interview, which include cover letters, resumes, and application materials.66 In Step Four, the Chief Immigration Judge and the EOIR Director will choose the best three candidates based off of those packets.67 Then, in Step Five, another three member panel that consists
of the EOIR Director, a career member of the Senior Executive Service chosen by the Deputy Attorney General, and a non-career member of the Senior Executive Service will be established and “will
interview as many of the three candidates as they think appropriate.”68 This panel will then recommend one of these three applicants
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Otis, supra note 57, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to the Deputy Attorney General, who, in turn, will recommend the
applicant for the Attorney General for approval.69 In Step Six, the
Attorney General makes his or her final selection.70 Finally, in Step
Seven, after a background check, the applicant chosen receives an
initial appointment and will proceed to complete the required training which includes an immigration law exam.71 After this training,
the applicant is ready to begin hearing immigration cases.72
However, this process underwent a significant change in 2017
when former Attorney General Jeff Sessions altered the Gonzales
Process.73 Aiming to “generally streamline and shorten the current
process,” Sessions altered features of the process that he deemed to
take too long to make a hiring decision.74 In Gonzales’s First Step,
Sessions chose to eliminate the duty of the Director of the EOIR and
the Chief Immigration Judge in re-reviewing the second and third
tiers for the purpose of ensuring that there were not any applicants
that needed to be bumped up.75 Another change, in Step Three, was
Sessions’s mandate that the three-member panel interviews have a
one-month deadline to be completed.76 In Step Four, Sessions mandated that the EOIR Director select five applicants, instead of three,
to “give more discretion to the panels at the next stage.”77 At Step
Five, rather than three panelists who would recommend a finalist,
two members would take its place; they would have two weeks to
make their decision.78 Moreover, at this same step, Sessions authorized the concurrent establishment of one panel to fill more than one
vacant position at a given time.79 Finally, at Step Seven, the Attorney General is now authorized to provide the applicant a temporary
appointment until they have received a full background check.80
69

Otis, supra note 57, at 6.
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Dana J. Boente, Memorandum for the Attorney General: Immigration
Judge Hiring Process (April 4, 2007).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Boente, supra note 73.
80
Id.
70
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In sum, the hiring of immigration judges changed from an indepth, multi-layered review process of each applicant in the Gonzales Process to a streamlined and expedited version under the Sessions Process.
C.

Canadian Civil Service System
The Canadian civil service system, officially known as the Canadian Public Service, is governed primarily by two significant
pieces of legislation: The Public Service Employment Act (PSEA)
and the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment
Act (hereinafter “Labour Relations Act”).81 Under the PSEA, the
Canadian Public Service is generally controlled by the Public Service Commission, who “has the exclusive authority to make appointments, to or from within the public service, of persons for
whose appointment there is no authority in or under any other Act
of Parliament.”82 The Commission’s objective when making hiring
decisions is to hire exclusively on the basis of merit, which is
achieved when “the person to be appointed meets the essential qualifications for the work to be performed . . . .”83
Employees of the Canadian Public Service could be laid-off in
accordance with regulations that the Commission has passed pursuant to its statutory authority.84 Removals pursuant to a lay-off can
only occur after a deputy head of the Commission
assess[es] the merit of the employees employed in
similar positions or performing similar duties in the
same occupational group and level within that part of
the organization, and identify, in accordance with
merit, the employees who are to be retained . . . and
the remaining employees who are to be advised that
their services are no longer required and are to be laid
off.85
81

See Public Service Employment Act, S.C. 2003, C 22, pmbl. (Can.); see
Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act, S.C. 2003, pmbl. (Can.).
82
See Public Service Employment Act, S.C. 2003, C 22, § 29(1) (Can.) (emphasis added).
83
Id.
84
Id. § 64(1).
85
Public Service Employment Regulations, SOR/2005-334, § 21(1) (Can.).
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Therefore, labor cuts are afforded a level of process where the
Commission determines who is not absolutely essential according
to their merit. However, the PSEA also provides protections to those
in the Public Service who are removed from their appointed positions.86 For example, if an appointee to the Public Service has her
appointment revoked if there was “improper conduct that affected
the selection of the person appointed or proposed for appointment,”87 that appointee is statutorily provided with recourse to file a
complaint asserting the unreasonableness of the revocation.88 In
fact, the PSEA provides recourse even to those that were not appointed but who were passed over for an appointment that was given
to another if it were done as a result of an abuse of authority.89
While the PSEA provides this recourse, the Labour Relations
Act provides the specific methodology.90 Established in 2013, the
Labour Relations Board “administers the collective bargaining and
grievance adjudication systems for the federal public sector” and is
responsible for “resolving staffing complaints under the PSEA that
are related to internal appointments and layoffs . . . .”91 This Board
provides a trial-like hearing,92 where witnesses are summoned and
compelled to give testimony93; requires prehearing procedures take
place94; and allows compulsion of documents to be produced at any
stage of the proceeding.95 Furthermore, the Canadian Parliament has
ordered that every decision of this Board “is not to be questioned or
reviewed in any court . . . .,” with the exception of situations described in paragraph 18.1(4)(a), (b), or (e) of the Federal Courts

86

Public Service Employment Act § 66.
Id. § 67(1).
88
Id. §74.
89
Id. § 77(1).
90
See Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Act, S.C.
2013, C 40, § 20 (Can.)
91
Mandate, FEDERAL PUBLIC SECTOR LABOUR RELATIONS AND
EMPLOYMENT BOARD, https://pslreb-crtefp.gc.ca/en/about-us/mandate.html (last
updated Feb. 27, 2020).
92
See Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Act § 20.
93
Id. § 20(a).
94
Id. § 20(b).
95
Id. § 20(f).
87
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Act.96 The Canadian Federal Court can review Board decisions
when it:
(a) acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or refused to exercise its jurisdiction; (b)
failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or other procedure that it was required
by law to observe; . . . [or] (e) acted, or failed to act,
by reason of fraud or perjured evidence . . . .97
Therefore, the Canadian Public Service is accorded a level of
procedural protection from the Cabinet and Parliament through the
complaint procedure and trial-like hearings that are statutorily afforded to Public Service employees and applicants.
D.

Location of IRB Members in the Public Service
According to John Richards, former Chief Justice of the Federal
Court of Appeal of Canada and current NAFTA adjudicator, the independence of a particular administrative tribunal is “determined by
its enabling statute,” and the standard of independence depends “on
the language of the statute under which the agency acts . . . .”98 The
enabling statute for IRB members, the IRPA, details how the Refugee Protection Division is appointed and removed, and how reliant
they are on the PSEA.99 IRPA states that members of the Refugee
Protection Division are to be “appointed in accordance with the Public Service Employment Act.”100 Therefore, these board members
undergo “written tests, [and] are screened and interviewed by IRB
officials, external experts and panels . . . before being recommended
by the Minister for appointment.”101
96

Id. § 34(1).
Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, C F-7, § 18.1(4)(a), (b), (e) (Can.).
98
John Richards, Administrative Tribunals in Canada: An Overview 8 (Nov.
2007),
http://www.aihja.org/images/users/ARCHIVES/docuthequedocs/EReportCanada2.pdf.
99
Act, rules and regulations, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF
CANADA,
https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/act-rules-regulations/Pages/index.aspx (Feb. 4, 2020).
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More important, however, are the protections that these members have with regard to removal from office. Unlike the provision
asserting that appointments must be made pursuant to PSEA,102
IRPA makes no reference whatsoever in their provision on complaints and removals as being tied to the PSEA. Any disciplinary
measures against a member of the board can only be taken on a “for
cause” basis, particularly when a member “has become incapacitated from the proper execution of that office by reason of infirmity,
has been guilty of misconduct, has failed in the proper execution of
that office or has been placed, by conduct or otherwise, in a position
that is incompatible with due execution of that office.”103 Therefore,
the Prime Minister of Canada does not have the power to remove a
member of the board “at-will.” Furthermore, even after this good
cause process to decide disciplinary measures, there must still be a
process where fact-finding, mediation, and/or inquiries may be
taken before termination.104 However, given the statute’s silence,
IRB members do not seem to be entitled to the Labour Relations Act
hearing process.
III.

ANALYSIS

A.

Problems Facing the Canadian System
Members of the IRB, particularly the Refugee Protection Division, face serious problems with regard to public trust, which stem
from their view of bias and lack of insulation from political objectives. This is especially apparent with the widely disparate asylum
grant rates between different members’ jurisdictions.
In 2001, Dr. Lubomyr Luciuk, a former Board member of the
Refugee Protection Division, wrote an opinion piece that was published in four major Canadian newspapers105 entitled “How

102
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‘Refugees’ and Terrorists Get Into Canada.”106 In his first two sentences, he claimed that the first lesson that refugee claimants must
learn before they arrive is to “[b]e a liar.”107 He claims that they lie
about having no identity documents, are vague about who they are
and where they are from, and feign crying.108 If they follow these
steps, Luciuk claims that achieving refugee status would be a simple
cakewalk—“unless,” as he pointedly speculates, “you are an utter
imbecile . . . .”109 As if he has not already gotten to his point, he concludes that
If the IRB continues to operate as it has, then just
about anyone and everyone who wants to get into
Canada will . . . Then our country will disappear, as
surely as New York’s World Trade Center vanished
in a holocaust perpetrated by the terrorists who exploited our lax immigration laws to worm their way
amongst us.110
It was then no surprise then that Luciuk—or as he proudly
named himself, “Dr. No”—would deny more than ninety percent of
the asylum claims that he heard during his service as a member between 1996 and 1998.111 In 2019, despite a review process of his
performance those years, “Dr. No” was brought back in as a Board
member as part of a Legacy Task Force, “a special group of retired
refugee judges rehired to deal with a backlog of roughly 5,500 cases
dating back to at least December 2012.”112
Luciuk is by no means a complete outlier in the obscenely disparate grant rates. Based off a comprehensive study of asylum grant
rates of each Board member in 2006,113 the disparate granting rates
106
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are more systemic. This study, published in the Ottawa Law Review,
flagged the five Board members with the most extreme variations
from the mean grant rate in those who grant and those who deny.114
Beginning with those of which were excessively positive in their
grant rates, Susan Kitchner, out of 107 cases presented in 2006,
granted 92.52% of those claims; Dominique Lederoq, out of eighty
cases presented, granted 91.25% of those claims; and Gilles Ethier,
out of 138 cases presented, granted 95.65% of those claims.115 On
the other hand, the grant rates of the five most negative are much
more shocking: Sarwanjit Randhawa, out of eighty-four cases presented, granted only 19.05% of those claims; Wilbert Wilson, out of
seventy-two cases presented, granted only 16.67% of those claims;
and Roger Houde, out of ninety cases, granted only 6.67% of those
presented.116
What, then, do such disparate grant rates mean for the perception
of the Board and general trust of that Board? Such large denial rates
in excess of eighty to ninety percent breed an idea that some Board
members may have made up their minds before the actual hearing
itself. For example, University of Toronto law professor and former
litigator for refugee claimants, Hilary Evans Cameron,117 asserts that
refugees “must be presumed to be telling the truth until proven otherwise”118 as evidenced by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.119
However, the Board is plagued with other valid criticisms as
well. For instance, one study found that “members had difficulty administering and assessing the evidence, understanding the political
and social conditions in other countries, interpreting administrative
and international law and understanding the rules of politeness and
decorum.”120 That same study also found that rates of “cultural misunderstanding, prejudice and stereotyping” were significantly high
114

Id.
Id. at 343.
116
Id.
117
Hilary Evans Cameron, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO: CENTER FOR ETHICS,
https://ethics.utoronto.ca/hilary-evans-cameron/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2020).
118
Hill, supra note 105 .
119
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 11(d) (U.K.).
120
Pia Zambelli, Paradigm Shift: Towards a New Model for Refugee Status
Determination in Canada, 51 U.B.C. L. REV. 229, 240 (2018).
115

2020]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

77

for members of the Board.121 Another criticism leveled against the
IRB is its failure to develop a settled internal case law.122 In the
United States, the BIA produces case law that the court itself relies
upon and which attorneys refer to in all filings and hearings.123 Because none of the Canadian Board hearings rely on such settled internal case law, some argue that this “suggest[s] a suboptimal level
of engagement with the subject matter . . . .”124
As a result of all of these criticisms, there is no surprise that the
general public seems to have such a poor trust of Board members in
general.125 What possible options does Canada have in boosting
public trust?
B.

Argument for Insulation and Trust
Lawmakers and legal practitioners each have their part to play
in achieving a better level of trust for the IRB. First, this section will
focus on the practical arguments that legal practitioners in the field
could make to not only invalidate potentially unfair results to their
clients, but to also rehabilitate the image of the Board without resorting to the policy tools that lawmakers possess. Second, I will
argue that lawmakers would better rehabilitate the image of the IRB
by providing the level of removal protections that the Public Service
has in the PSEA rather than its own statutory protections.
The key for rehabilitation through litigation is arguing attitudinal or institutional bias in direct violation of the common law and
the Canadian Bill of Rights. A critical issue that many in the field
seem to be faced with is the limited amount of judicial review that
the Federal Court of Canada has over its decisions. While it is true
that IRPA allows judicial review “with respect to any matter,”126 the
types of cases appealed to the Federal Court of Canada are limited
by the Federal Courts Act.127 Such appeals for judicial review to the
121
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Federal Court are only permitted if at least one of six grounds previously mentioned is established.128 These grounds face a notoriously high bar of tribunal wrongdoing that must have been met, such
as anything related to proper jurisdiction129 or a failure in “observ[ing] a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or other
procedure it was required by law to observe.”130 Therefore, on its
face, it seems like a refugee appealing their denial of entry would
have a very difficult chance to have their case appealed to the Federal Court.
However, there is a body of law, rarely used in the field of IRB
appeal, that could potentially prove useful in bringing about real independence and trust to the Canadian judiciary: the common law
rule of nemo judex in sua causa debet esse.131 Literally translated to
“no man shall be a judge in his own cause,”132 the rule has come to
be recognized as a doctrine against administrative bias, which could
“render any administrative action void and thereby subject to successful judicial review.”133 Because this has been recognized as a
principle of natural justice,134 and the Canadian Bill of Rights has
expressly found that a “fair and public hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal” is a basic right,135 practitioners would be
able to argue that this is a valid ground of appeal to the Federal
Court. This would be instrumental in minimizing the risk of Board
member abuse of the likes of “Dr. No” while also increasing the
level of trust since another set of independent eyes will be allowed
to review the issue. Canadian common law has recognized two
forms of bias that are relevant to the issue at hand: attitudinal bias
and institutional bias.136
While bias is typically found more often in the areas of pecuniary or institutional bias, attitudinal bias, being “in favour of a
128
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particular outcome,” indeed happens and has been identified before
through judicial review.137 Generally, Canadian courts hold that the
test for attitudinal bias is presence of an independence of mind.138
According to a landmark case on this doctrine, Bethany Care Centre
v. United Nurses of Alberta, the only way to succeed in a claim of
attitudinal bias is to show that the adjudicator could not “form an
honest conclusion regardless of his sympathies or loyalties[.]”139
Furthermore, in Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning,
the British court did not find attitudinal bias;140 however, the court
crucially looked toward the previous language of the adjudicator under review, indicating that such language can be used as a basis of
determining whether there was true independence of mind.141 Based
on this case law, practitioners clearly have options when dealing
with particular Board members. For example, when faced with
Board members such as “Dr. No,” there is a significant chance of
victory in a federal appeal when they have been very vocal that refugees are always liars or if they have indicated a strong proclivity
against refugee entrance. Attitudinal bias can, and should, be argued
if institutional trust and legitimacy is sought. Moreover, attitudinal
bias could also be argued for those judges who have abysmally low
grant rates (i.e. below ten percent) and who have those low grant
rates against refugees from particular locations in the world. Although this is not conclusive evidence, the Federal Courts Act requires no such absolute burden of proof; in fact, they may choose to
grant this relief “if it is satisfied” that such an instance is occurring.142
Not only do practitioners have the option to argue attitudinal
bias, but they also have the chance to argue institutional bias under
this doctrine. The point of focus for such practitioners should be the
reappointment process of Board members; while they are initially
appointed for three year terms, these members “are eligible for reappointment in the same or another capacity” when that term comes
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to an end.143 While such a reappointment process seems normal on
its face because appointing a completely new person “takes between
six and twelve months and $100,000 to fully train a new member,”144 how it is being done has raised some concerns of political
bias. Board members are recommended for reappointment through
an internal IRB Performance Review Committee, which is officially
charged with “overseeing the appraisal process and providing to the
Minister ‘at the end of a member’s term as advice on reappointment.’”145 Given their expertise as to what works and what does not,
it would be expected that the Minister would provide a significant
level of deference to such a recommendation; in fact, the opposite
seems to be the case. In the period of January 1, 2006 and March 31,
2009, out of eighty-nine Board members that were recommended
for reappointment, the Governor-in-Council only reappointed fortytwo percent of them.146 Therefore, rather than reappointing individuals who have been found by their own agency to be competent, the
Minister and Governor-in-Council chose the alternative of spending
$4,300,000 on training all of these new appointees and dozens of
cumulative years of training for new appointees.147 Because the IRB
chairperson in that period, Jean Guy Fleury, intimated that “the Minister’s discretion over reappointments created a politicized process,”148 it is quite possible to make an argument of institutional bias
and thus form a basis of appeal to the Federal Court.
As a doctrine in Canadian law, the test for institutional bias in
the administrative context is spelled out in R v. Lippe, which asks
“whether a well-informed person would have a reasonable apprehension of bias in a substantial number of cases.”149 More specifically, such an apprehension must be rooted deeply in a “reasonable
person standard,” where the apprehension is “a reasonable one, held
by reasonable and right-minded persons, applying themselves to the
question and obtaining thereon the required information.”150 Just as
143
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in attitudinal bias, language by adjudicators or ministers is fair game
in determining a reasonable apprehension.151 Practitioners may be
able to argue institutional bias because, in the mind of a reasonable
person, the combination of abysmally low grant rates for certain
members, the public comments that Ministers have made in the past
regarding the subject,152 and the low reappointment rate indicate that
the institution has become so politicized as to render it incapable of
providing an impartial tribunal under the Canadian Bill of Rights.
Therefore, such a maelstrom of different factors could provide useful tools for the everyday practitioner to find the necessary review
in Federal Court where a more independent set of eyes may provide
the claimant a fairer day in court.
Finally, lawmakers themselves have the chance to improve upon
this system by providing Board members with more protection
against removal and disciplinary action; although this may not substantively affect levels of bias or politicization, this would at least
provide some sort of boost in the national trust of the institution that
the government is indeed committed to a fair and impartial tribunal
for refugee claimants. The easiest route for lawmakers is to fully
incorporate the IRB within the Public Service. Under IRPA, the IRB
is not bound by the PSEA’s removal protections because they are
provided with their own removal provisions.153 As mentioned before, some level of “good cause” must exist in order for disciplinary
action to take place against Board members; however, they are not
entitled to the complaint process that members of the Public Service
have, that is, a trial-like hearing in front of the Federal Labour Relations Board.154 Though in certain circumstances they may have the
right to hearings, mediation, or investigations, they are not entitled
to them as a right as members of Board.155 Therefore, it seems that
Board members could theoretically be removed with much less process than members of the Public Service. To increase the level of
trust in its immigration institutions, Canadian lawmakers would do
well in incorporating the PSEA protections here.
151

Id.
Hill, supra note 105.
153
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001,
(Can.).
154
See id.
155
See id.
152

C

27 §§ 176-177

82

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:59

By increasing the chances of federal judicial review and providing a much more insulated removal process, this combination of actions would provide at least a better level of trust in the institution,
much like a scholarly article is given much more credence when peer
reviewed.
C.

Problems Facing the American System

1. General Public Image
The Executive Office of Immigration Review also deals with an
unwelcome image and general lack of trust, particularly in major
American media outlets. For example, in August 2019, Attorney
General Barr appointed six immigration judges to the Board of Immigration Appeals.156 While this is not usually a cause for concern,
the impartiality of these judges was called into question when they
were notorious for significantly high rates of asylum denial: well
over eighty-five percent.157 Three of these immigration judges have
received strong complaints in the past: two have been selected from
a court that has “drawn complaints of unfair proceedings from immigration attorneys and advocates”158; the other has been known to
have an extensive history of denying asylum claims to domestic violence victims.159
Claims of impartiality, however, do not stop there. Also in August 2019, Barr proposed an interim rule under section 553 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)160 that would give the director
of EOIR, who is himself not an immigration judge, “the power to
personally decide the longest-running cases.”161 Such plenary power
wielded by an appointed political figure would no doubt imply that
156
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immigration judges are not insulated. However, such politicization
of the immigration judiciary is not specific to President Trump, despite its prevalence in the news; significant studies and scholarship
have alleged that the George W. Bush Administration either condoned or encouraged hiring of immigration judges along political
lines, illustrating the propensity of the Executive to use immigration
judges for political objectives.162
2. Lucia v. SEC and the Removal of Examinations
In 2018, concern over the bias and politicization of immigration
judges reemerged after the Supreme Court ruling in Lucia v. SEC.163
Before going into the facts and procedural posture of the case, it is
important to note the unique structure of the SEC ALJ appointment
process. The SEC has been given the authority by Congress to “enforce the nation’s securities laws.”164 In hearing cases, the SEC typically has an ALJ conduct proceedings.165 However, staff members,
rather than the Commission itself, select the five ALJs that hear securities cases.166 As part of their duties, SEC ALJs have the powers
of “supervising discovery; issuing, revoking, or modifying subpoenas; deciding motions; ruling on the admissibility of evidence; administering oaths; hearing and examining witnesses; generally
‘[r]egulating the course of’ the proceeding and the ‘conduct of the
parties and their counsel’; and imposing sanctions for ‘contemptuous conduct’ or violations of procedural requirements.”167 In fact,
SEC ALJs have authority “comparable to” a federal district judge.168
After a hearing, the ALJ makes conclusions about “‘issues of fact
162
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[and] law,’” and the appropriate penalties to impose.169 Thereafter,
the SEC may choose to review this decision “upon request or sua
sponte,” or it can choose to not review the decision, where it will
then become final and representative of the Commission’s intent.170
In Lucia, the SEC initiated an administrative proceeding against
Raymond Lucia, who owned and operated an investment company.171 The SEC alleged that he had used a “misleading slideshow
presentation to deceive prospective clients” in marketing his new
retirement savings strategy entitled “Buckets of Money.”172 After
being charged by the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act, ALJ
Cameron Elliot was assigned to hear Lucia’s case.173 A nine-day
trial proceeded with testimony and argument, and Judge Elliot determined that Lucia was in violation of the Investment Advisers Act,
resulting in civil penalties of $300,000 and “a lifetime bar from the
investment industry.”174 It should be noted that the SEC charged Elliot with making factual findings.175 On appeal, Lucia argued that
the hearing he was afforded in front of the ALJ was constitutionally
invalid because the ALJs for the SEC are “Officers of the United
States” and should thus be appointed only by the President, “Courts
of Law,” or “Heads of Departments.”176 Because the ALJ was not
appointed by the Commission itself, a “Head[] of Department[],”
but instead by SEC staff members, Lucia pointed out that Judge Elliot had no constitutional authority to hear his case.177 On the other
hand, the SEC argued that Lucia’s argument fails because these
ALJs are not “Officers” but are “‘mere employees’—officials with
lesser responsibilities who fall outside the Appointments Clause’s
ambit.”178 After the D.C. Circuit rejected Lucia’s argument, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari on the issue of
whether SEC ALJs are “Officers” or “mere employees.”179
169
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Reversing the D.C. Circuit, the Court cited three key cases that
have previously dealt with Appointments Clause questions: United
States v. Germaine,180 Buckley v. Valeo,181 and Freytag v. Commissioner.182 In Germaine, the Court established that a requirement for
being an “Officer” is that the individual “must occupy a ‘continuing’
position established by law to qualify as an officer.”183 The Court
easily found that SEC ALJs fall under this prong as they are statutorily set up as a continuing position.184 In Valeo, the Court added
that to be an “Officer,” the position must also “exercise significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.”185 On this question, the Court has historically had trouble defining what “significant authority” means. In Freytag, the Court held that special trial
judges that help the Tax Court judges are indeed officers and not
mere employees because “they perform more than ministerial tasks.
They take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery
orders.”186 In other words, these tasks for Tax Court judges were
dispositive in making them “Officers” rather than mere employees.
Transplanting the standard that the Freytag Court used for much
more independent Article I tax judges to Article II ALJs, the Lucia
Court held that because SEC ALJs have the power to “ensure fair
and orderly adversarial hearings” through the use of taking testimony, admitting or denying evidence, and other tasks of federal district court judges while also being given the power of finality when
the SEC refuses to review the decision, SEC ALJs appropriately fall
within the sphere of an “Officer” rather than a mere employee.187
More specifically, the Court considered them to be inferior officers
and must be appointed in accordance with the Appointments
Clause.188
The effect of this decision was by no means narrow; in fact, President Trump used this as a springboard for presidential policy. In
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Executive Order 13,843, released on July 10, 2018, President Trump
indicated that the Lucia decision indicates that “at least some—and
perhaps all—ALJs are ‘Officers of the United States’ and thus subject to the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, which governs who
may appoint such officials.”189 The President’s claims also call into
question whether the competitive service selection procedures, including examinations, are still compatible with the Appointments
Clause.190 Therefore, to “reduce the likelihood of successful Appointments Clause challenges,” the President, pursuant to section
3302(1) of Title 5 of the U.S. Code, has ordered that competitive
hiring rules and examinations be excepted for the selection and appointment of ALJs.191 Other than requiring the baseline rule that
these ALJs have a license to practice law, the only requirements in
selection “shall be made in accordance with such regulations and
practices as the head of the agency concerned finds necessary.”192
In other words, the only requirements are those which the agency
deems necessary to be qualified. No longer do the civil service competitive hiring rules have binding effect on these ALJs; in fact, unless there is a successful judicial challenge to this order, ALJs for
each agency seem to be only subject to the whims of the hiring department, rather than a potentially more independent OPM.
Because immigration judges are ALJs and potentially subject to
Lucia’s new understanding of ALJs as “Officers,” the possibility of
further politicization of immigration is much higher since the Attorney General no longer needs to conduct examinations and, as was
mentioned at the beginning of this Note, has the power to remove
these judges at-will as is his or her right as a “Head[] of Department[].” What options do practitioners have in (1) arguing against
Lucia’s application to immigration judges, and (2) arguing for increased civil service protections of immigration judges?
D.

Arguments For Insulation
In this Part, I will offer two potential arguments that could be
made to either avoid or mitigate the consequences of Lucia’s affects
on the immigration judiciary: (1) Although immigration judges are
189
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“Officers,” they are principal offers rather than inferior officers,
thereby affording them the insulation of a Senate confirmation process; and/or (2) Lucia’s scope does not extend to immigration judges
because immigration judges are set up as direct representatives of
the Attorney General rather than distinct positions within already
independent executive agencies. This Note will argue that the second option is the most likely to succeed.
1. The Principal Officer Argument
This “Principal Officer” argument can be more aptly regarded
as a “lean into the punch” strategy because it assumes that Lucia
applies to the case at hand and therefore seeks to mitigate the result.
The benefit of arguing principal officer status for immigration
judges is that, if achieved, it would result in the requirement that the
Senate confirm each immigration judge.193 Such a result would lead
to two branches of government signing off on the appointment, a
form of insulation built within the Constitution.194 A brief overview
of the case law on this subject is worth repeating. In Morrison v.
Olson, the Court held that there are four factors to consider in determining who is an inferior or principal officer: (1) the officer’s removability by a superior executive branch official; (2) the scope of
the officer’s duties; (3) the scope of the officer’s jurisdiction; and
(4) the tenure of the office at issue.195 However, unsatisfied with the
fact that such a rubric implies that every officer that is not a Cabinet
member is inferior, the Court revisited the issue in Edmond v. United
States.196 The Court modified the test with a much more strict rubric,
stating that inferior officers are those “whose work is directed and
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”197
However, these cases were decided in a pre-Lucia world. Therefore, it is also worth noting how different circuits have adapted these
cases after Lucia. It seems that circuits prefer the Edmond test rather
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than the Morrison test in application.198 In Arthrex v. Smith &
Nephew, there was a patent dispute between both parties that was
being heard by the Patent Trial Appeal Board (PTAB).199 Arthrex
argued that under the precedent established by Lucia, the PTAB
ALJs selected under the competitive hiring rules and examination
were unconstitutionally appointed under the Appointments
Clause.200 On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that these judges were
principal officers under the Appointments Clause and conducted an
analysis under the Edmond test to determine this.201 Considering the
Edmond analysis to be a balancing test with no “exclusive criterion,”
they viewed it as a three-prong determination: “(1) whether an appointed official has the power to review and reverse the officers’
decision; (2) the level of supervision and oversight an appointed official has over the officers; and (3) the appointed official’s power to
remove the officers.”202 It should be noted that the Federal Circuit
considered the Morrison factors to be relevant under Edmond.203 If
these prongs tip more in favor of autonomy for the officer, then an
officer would be more likely to be a principal officer under Edmond.204 Because the Director of the PTAB cannot directly order a
review of ALJ decisions and the lack of unfettered authority to remove these ALJs, the court determined that this was sufficient to
render them principal officers.205
How would this translate to immigration judges? Under the review prong, the balancing scale tips slightly in favor being an inferior officer. Under 8 C.F.R. section 1003.1(h)(1), “the Board [of Immigration Appeals] shall refer to the Attorney General for review of
its decision all cases that (i) the Attorney General directs the Board
to refer to him; (ii) [t]he Chairman or a majority of the Board believes should be referred to the Attorney General for review.”206 Under this process known as “self-referral,” the Attorney General has
198
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the right to review any decision of the BIA.207 Although the Attorney General is not required to do this, it does lean in favor of inferiority under this prong. Under the supervisory prong, the balance
weighs much more in favor of being principal officers. There is very
little procedure on an immigration judge’s day-to-day activity that
is expressly provided by the Attorney General. Whatever policy
does exist, a significant portion of that policy is for practitioners
themselves seeking to represent clients or make motions.208 Under
the removal prong, there is very little that can be argued here given
the very uncertain nature of this after the President’s Executive Order.209
Nevertheless, if Morrison is still taken into consideration when
conducting an Edmond analysis, then the balance would tip much
further in favor of being a principal officer. Considering the scope
of the officer’s duties, immigration judges have a pretty broad set of
responsibilities: They take testimony, admit or deny evidence, order
removals, and all other duties usually found within a full trial.210
Although their jurisdiction is limited to immigration issues, this is
by no means a small field, as evidenced by the over 900,000 cases
currently pending as of the time of this writing.211 Finally, the tenure
of these immigration judges have no definite limit of any kind; in
fact, they serve until either they are removed at-will or for good
cause (depending on how courts rule on their status as an officer).212
Based off of this line of reasoning, at trial and at oral argument,
going through this Edmond analysis could provide a way to mitigate
the politicized dangers of at-will employment for immigration
207
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judges by “leaning into the punch” and avoiding a complete politicized hiring. However, there are very real problems with this argument, aside from the uncertainties of trial. Firstly, making this argument sacrifices removal protections for non-political hiring. Because principal officers serve at the pleasure of the President or cabinet member, they can still be removed just as inferior officers can
be. Second, non-political hiring is an assumption from this result; it
does not consider that the Senate may be controlled by the same
party as the President, rendering any gains from this argument futile.
Third, appointments could be significantly drawn out to no end
based on partisan politicking; in fact, the recent Kavanaugh confirmation process and the presidential cabinet appointments after President Trump’s inauguration indicate this as the new normal rather
than a hiccup in history.213 Finally, this last point can extend further;
if the confirmation process is drawn out, that would mean that cases
would be piling up with no officials hearing cases.
Although the arguments to designate principal officer status are
convincing, in terms of outcome and policy, they fail to live up to
standards of judicial economy and non-political removal. Thus, this
Note recommends the next argument.
2. Lucia does not apply to the case at hand
While less technical, this argument employs the tools of analogizing and distinguishing the standards set up in Freytag and Lucia.
While Lucia may have been decided correctly, this argument focuses on how Lucia just simply does not apply to immigration
judges. The key to doing this is pointing out the very key differences
between the positions in Freytag and Lucia with the position of immigration judges. In Freytag, the position in question was that of a
Special Trial Judge (STJ).214 STJs work under Tax Court judges.215
The United States Tax Court is an Article I court established by Congress under the constitutional authority granted them to “constitute
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Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.”216 In other words, these
judges do not answer to the executive, but rather to Congress, or
whenever there is a need for judicial review, to the appropriate Court
of Appeal. They can only be terminated “for inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office.”217 Put differently, tax court judges,
and by extension STJs, are very independent figures who have significant autonomy in their choices and with little consequences for
particular decisions made that are lawful. Moreover, the SEC ALJs
are within a similar status. Although they are an executive agency,
they are considered an independent executive agency which is generally known to be those agencies where “Congress has given an
agency’s top-level decision makers job security.”218 These agencies
are typically those multi-member agencies such as the Federal Reserve, the SEC, the Commodities and Futures Trading Commission,
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.219 In terms of decision making, these agencies retain significant discretion in policy
choice because of the mere fact that they can only be removed based
on some form of good cause.220
However, this level of independence cannot be made of immigration judges. In fact, as they stand at the moment, immigration
judges legally are not independent in the most common use of the
phrase. For instance, immigration judges actually represent the Attorney General in all immigration proceedings as adjudicators.221
Theoretically, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, there is
no specific requirement for immigration judges.222 In other words,
the immigration judges are the Attorney General in the simplest
form. Of course, these judges take evidence, hear cases, and handle
other trial-like activity.223 However, they only do so in lieu of the
216
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Attorney General;224 Congress did not separately task them to conduct these proceedings, and Congress did not provide them with the
same removal protection in the same form as they did with the SEC,
the Federal Reserve, and other independent executive agencies.
Therefore, if and when a practitioner uses Lucia to argue that immigration judges are also inferior officers because of their significant
authority to conduct these trials just like the STJs in Freytag, the
clear response is to question the level of authority these judges really
are exercising. As direct representatives of a principal officer, as a
matter of law, there is not any significant authority that is being exercised without the consent of the Attorney General. Furthermore,
this argument can be used offensively as well rather than defensively. In response to the Executive Order removing competitive hiring rules, practitioners seeking to bring those protections back in a
binding way for immigration judges can make this argument and
ensure that either the Sessions or the Gonzales method of immigration judge selection remains.
As previously stated, though there is not a whole lot of technical
basis for this argument, the effectiveness of this argument is that
there has yet to be a challenge to any agency that has not been an
independent executive agency. As of the time of this writing, no
challenge has been leveled at immigration judges and their validity.
Therefore, if a challenge is to be made in the near future, this argument has both the benefit of (1) flipping Lucia on its head by highlighting how little legal significant authority immigration judges really possess, as well as (2) retaining both the appointment and removal protections from political influence.
V.
CONCLUSION
After going over both the Canadian and American immigration
adjudication systems, this Note first identified the significant problem of public trust and politicization that these institutions are facing
in recent years, and identified the solution to this as being the need
to entrench the respective immigration judiciaries within their civil
service systems of appointment and removal. Thereafter, this Note
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sought to provide real, practical methods that could be used to
achieve this goal.
In the Canadian system, the general public is struggling with
how to handle IRB members without abysmally low asylum grant
rates that may be fueled either by attitudinal or, worse, institutional
bias. Because of the potential bias, practitioners could make arguments on the basis of common law precedents that have been used
in the field of administrative law to ensure that these judges are insulated from political whims by increasing judicial review by Canadian Federal Courts. Furthermore, this Note also suggested that Canadian lawmakers fully integrate the features of removal protections
that the Canadian Public Service normally receives in place of the
weaker protections that the IRB currently has by statute.
In the American system, this Note highlighted the most recent
conundrum facing the immigration courts in lieu of the Supreme
Court decision in Lucia. Detailing the methodology used by the
Court in Lucia in determining whether an official is an “Officer”
under the Appointments Clause or a mere employee, this Note then
provided two arguments that practitioners could make in the field to
either defend against a challenge against the “employee” status of
immigration judges or ensure that competitive hiring rules and examinations remain for immigration judge selection.
By setting forth these arguments, this Note has sought to solve
the very hypothetical it began with. Entrenching an immigration judiciary further within the civil service system creates a level of comfort and job security that keeps judges from making decisions with
one eye looking over their shoulders.

